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Property and the Law in the Confederacy
Among the thousands of political and military histories of the Civil War, its
battles, leaders, soldiers, nurses, plantation wives, horses, weapons,
blockade-runners, spies, new technologies, slave narratives, railroads,
photographers, mapmakers, and red-clay eaters, few scholars have addressed the
intrinsically relevant questions of how the war affected private property interests
of individuals who did not cleave to the government's agenda in ways
appropriate, or what the constitutional authority of the government was to
extinguish those property interests as punishment for disloyalty. In a republic
built upon the platform of ordered liberty, in which the notion that all citizens
were possessed of natural rights that included the rights to live free and own
property, the question demanded pre-eminence when the legislature undertook
action to extinguish such natural rights.
Daniel W. Hamilton has authored a significant tome that addresses these
questions in an intelligent and comprehensive manner. He focuses on the First
and Second Confiscation Acts of the United States Congress, and the
Sequestration Act of the Confederate Congress. Hamilton explores a subject that
by contemporary standards is taken as a foregone conclusionùthat the
government's power to confiscate property is very narrowly limited, and which
beyond the principle of eminent domain (for which just compensation must be
paid), exists solely as a punishment for individual crimes and can be applied only
by the courts. In the North the confiscation acts were made largely irrelevant by
Lincoln's announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation (his administration
would be too well-occupied defending and implementing that revolutionary
policy, to spend very much time attempting to carry out an incomprehensibly
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unwieldy and difficult Second Confiscation Act). However the debate over the
Second Confiscation Act occupied most of the time and energy of the
Thirty-Seventh Congress whose Members considered the act of critical
importance (2-3). Hamilton points out that The confiscation debates reveal a
relatively rare moment in American legal history when competing property
ideologies were subject to fierce, explicit, and open debate, not primarily
between academics, but among legislators and with the property of millions at
stake (3). And the author concludes that In a time of exuberant and
transformative change, when it came to the confiscation of enemy property,
Congress, surprisingly, restrained itself (4).
In the Confederacy, on the other hand, the judiciaryùseldom considered in
the history of the southern rebellionùwas remarkably active in its enforcement of
the Confederate Sequestration Act. Hamilton argues that scholars have focused
largely on the inability of the Confederacy to create a Supreme Court. This has
led some historians to minimize, or dismiss entirely, the work of the Confederate
judiciary as a whole. With the federal judiciary minimalized, and the state court
system playing the central role, Hamilton suggests that the whole system of
property confiscation, especially in a Confederacy where individual rights and
limited government were so highly valued, would be expected to meet with
resounding failure. However, Hamilton informs us that Confederate confiscation
proved a huge success. During the war a remarkably demanding confiscation
regime was imposed on a mostly willing citizenry by the Confederate courts. . . .
All citizens were required to inform the government of any enemy property of
which they were aware, whether in their possession or anybody else's, imposing
a clear legal obligation to inform on one's neighbors (6).
In perhaps the most compelling portion of his monograph, Hamilton details
the positions of the three different groups of legislators in the U.S. Congress who
waged the lengthy battle to determine the form of confiscation that the
government would conduct against rebels. For all of its many accomplishments,
the Thirty-Seventh Congress spent but a relatively brief amount of its time and
energy on such sweepingly progressive legislation as the enactment of the first
federal income tax, the first uniform national currency, and the first federal
military draft in American history. They spent much less time than one might
expect before enacting three pieces of legislation that created massive public
land grantsùthe Homestead Act, the Pacific Railway Act, and the Land Grant
College Act (three enactments primarily responsible for opening up the
American West, transforming the national economy, and providing for the
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widespread construction of public universities). But none of these debates came
close to occupying as much of Congress's attention, or proved to be nearly as
divisive, as the attempts to pass the Second Confiscation Act. Hamilton provides
a surgically precise history of legislative confiscation in America, with its
precedent in the Revolutionary War when a great deal of Loyalist property was
confiscated by legislative fiat, without recourse to the courts for individual trials
(2).
Hamilton shows how a powerful group of radicals, led by Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of the important Senate Judiciary Committee and
sponsor of the bill that would become the Second Confiscation Act, championed
the passage of legislation calling for the permanent seizure of all the real and
personal property of anyone who continuedàto take up arms in rebellion
oràcontinued to give the rebellion aid or comfort' (31). He described the
conservative attack on confiscation, led by Trumbull's fellow Illinoisan Orville
Browning, who declaimed, A state of war does not justify the civil power in
abrogating constitutions, nor in violating the rights of persons or property (41).
With the battle joined, and as the debate moved into the spring of 1862, it
became increasingly clear that a number of important Republicans were not
comfortable with Trumbull's bill and that it was not going to pass easily. And the
position propounded by conservatives had already begun to take shape even
before the Civil War, argued effectively by Chief Justice John Marshall in
decisions such as Fletcher v. Peck, and in the writings of a number of legal
theorists who had begun to posit that it was a fundamental function of the state to
protect individual property rights, not to extinguish them. This had led to the
emergence of a doctrine of vested rights which included, at its heart, the notion
that the lines between legislative and judicial authority over property must be
tightly drawn (46).
In the most interesting chapter of the book, Hamilton introduces us to The
Moderate Coup. At the height of the debate between the radicals and the
conservatives, Senator John Sherman of Ohio injected a new element into the
battle. He introduced a substitute bill on the Senate floor (since he couldn't
possibly get the Trumbull-led Judiciary Committee to seriously consider it) that
significantly changed the scope of the proposed confiscation legislation by
limiting its application to only those Confederate civil and military officials
whose rank would mark them as leaders of the rebellion. That in itself would not
have taken the heart out of the radical confiscation bill. But Sherman's bill
mandated judicial proceedings before seizure could be done legally, a serious
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blow to the radical notion that legislative confiscation could take place. A great
deal of squabbling in the debate took place in the early summer over the question
of how extensively the courts would be able to employ in rem proceedings,
allowing them to take jurisdiction based on the venue of the property to be
forfeited and not on the presence of the offender being charged.
In the middle of July the legislation may have been moving close to passage
when Daniel Clark of New Hampshire introduced an explanatory resolution to
be appended to the Confiscation Act. It provided, in part: Nor shall any
punishment or proceeding under said act be so construed as to work a forfeiture
of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life (75). It was the
invocation of the Article I, Section 9 prohibition in the constitution against the
enactment of any bill of attainder. Bills of attainder were a device by which the
King had historically been able to attaint the family of a wrongdoer so as to
collect his damages from people other than the offender. The permanent seizure
of a person's property extinguishes not only their claim in the property, but also
the future interests of any heirs as well. Clark made it clear that he did not
support the resolution but had been authorized to say that if it was passed then
President Lincoln would sign it. Clark had been tapped by the White House to
deliver an important message to the Congress: the president considered the
legislation to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. However if
legislators would simply agree to include this explanatory statement (which
effectively made the legislation meaningless) then the chief executive would
forego doing something he almost never didùveto an act of Congress. When
Lincoln weighed in on the question of confiscation, he did so very clearly, taking
the same position that Browning and the conservatives had stated from the
beginning. As he did on so many occasions, Lincoln had employed his wisdom
to puncture the balloon of legislative confiscation before it ever had the
opportunity to take flight. And he had done so while appearing seeming to
support the legislation by signing it into law, once the resolution had passed.
If there is one thing that this reviewer would take issue with in Hamilton's
otherwise very fine treatise, it is that if legislation had passed and been enforced
in anything close to its original form, it might have very well set a precedent for
government actions in future wars to destroy and demean the citizen's right to
dissent. The doctrine of vested rights was not so well-established by 1861, that it
could not have been dismantled by overwhelmingly Republican Congress intent
upon punishing treason by the most powerful weapon it could wield. A United
States government focused on retribution could have stripped the
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property-owning class of the South of its wealth for generations. The significant
bitterness experienced by a defeated South might have been increased
exponentially over what actually did occur in the years after the war. It is not
inconceivable that in the war-torn wasteland that the South was in the spring of
1865, the possibilities of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and lingering hatred for
many years might have ruled the day, and an entire section of the nation left
impoverished into the twentieth century.
David E. Long is professor of history at East Carolina University. Trained
as a lawyer and a historian, he has authored numerous works on Abraham
Lincoln and the Civil War era, including The Jewel of Liberty: Abraham
Lincoln's Re-election and the End of Slavery (1994).
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